University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Public Choice and Law's Either/Or Inclination (reviewing Leo Katz,
Why the Law is So Perverse (2011))
Saul Levmore

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Saul Levmore, "Public Choice and Law's Either/Or Inclination (reviewing Leo Katz, Why the Law is So
Perverse (2011))," 79 University of Chicago Law Review 1663 (2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

REVIEW

Public Choice and Law's Either/Or Inclination
Saul Levmoret
Why the Law Is So Perverse
Leo Katz. Chicago, 2011. Pp ix, 239.
INTRODUCTION

Public choice theory has had an easy time infiltrating law where
interest-group activity is manifest. It has had less success appealing
to lawyers when it comes to legal decision making. A handful of academics have mastered the idea that appellate courts are multimember decision bodies, apt to cycle, or reveal intransitivities, as they
consider multiple subjects in a single case.' A larger group of academics and judges, influenced perhaps by the fluid, debatable, and
yet hardly mysterious annual rankings of college football teams, recognizes that judicial results might depend on the order in which cases
are considered, much as two teams with one defeat might be ranked
differently depending, among other things, on when each suffered its
loss. But analogy and integration are not the same thing. Occasionally, Professor Leo Katz's marvelous book, Why the Law Is So Perverse, is brave enough to suggest that law and collective choice are so
connected as to be one thing. The title might seem to promise that a
few strange outliers can be speared with a single tool -and the book
certainly delivers on that assurance-but at times the volume can be
understood as beginning with seemingly perverse results and then
expanding the argument until a monumental and parsimonious claim
is made. Such audacity needs to be approached in a few steps.
t William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
1

See, for example, Maxwell L. Stearns, ConstitutionalProcess:A Social Choice Analysis

of Supreme Court Decision Making 97-106 (Michigan 2000). See also David Post and Steven C.
Salop, Rowing against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 Georgetown

L J 743, 749-50 (1992).
2
See, for example, Stearns, Constitutional Process at 28-30 (cited in note 1); Leandra
Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involve-

ment in Settlements?, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 221, 244-46 (1999).
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1. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE

Katz's stated strategy is to look at four kinds of oddities in law.'
I will focus on two of these when summarizing his insights and
launching into new terrain, but, as it turns out, the entry point does
not much matter because the four oddities eventually yield to common analysis. Consider a case that Katz characterizes as a "loophole." A defendant, Charles (as in Bronson, the illusory vigilante),
would like to kill A without suffering legal consequences. If A attacks Charles, Charles can kill in self-defense (the "Self-Defense"
option) or choose to allow A, the attacker, to kill him (the "Suffer
Injury" option). Either is permissible; we have no reason to rank one
above the other, or so Katz insists (p 110). He then adds a third possibility: Charles can run away in retreat (the "Retreat" option). Retreat is now law's favorite option-except in the case where Charles
is being attacked in his own home, but let us not complicate things
unnecessarily, especially because Katz resists doing so. The interesting thing is that the introduction of this third option demotes the first
option. Charles can still choose to stand his ground and be hurt, but,
in the presence of the option to retreat, he cannot kill A in selfdefense. This sets the stage for the legal loophole, or perversity. If
Charles wants to kill A, he needs to plan in advance in order to eliminate his own option to retreat. If Charles can arrange to be attacked
where there is no easy means of retreat, then Charles can kill as he
pleases (pp 76, 109-14).
Readers who have not yet read Katz's book will trust me, I
hope, when I say that Katz pulls off such examples with great skill.
There are many objections one might have to this particular oddity,
and I have tried to sprinkle several about in the retelling, but Katz
does a fine job of developing details in order to parry the likely objections and make the examples compelling. There is no point in rehearsing all these maneuvers in this Review.
Katz's great insight is to map this loophole strategy-along with
other legal perversities-onto the backbone of public choice theory
and Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. 4 The first step toward

3 Katz seeks to employ social choice theory to explain four regularly observed "perversities" in legal doctrine: (1) why the law prohibits certain mutually beneficial transactions between consenting parties; (2) why the law permits loopholes, or creative workarounds, that appear to subvert its purpose; (3) why the law strictly delineates between acts that give rise to
criminal or civil liability and acts that do not when actual cases are much less clear-cut; and (4)
why the law occasionally seems inconsistent with general, intuitive moral principles (pp 8-11).
4 See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II: A Revised Edition of Public Choice 385-407
(Cambridge 1989). See also note 5.
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understanding this connection is to see that the doctrine of selfdefense seeks to accommodate two different and sometimes competing principles: that of "no disproportionate punishment," such that
the attacker does not deserve the death penalty, as well as that of a
"rights principle," such that one can stand on one's rights and do
what it takes to forestall another's interference with them (p 111). If
only one principle were in play, it would be relatively easy to rank
options according to this principle. But as additional principles are
introduced, options are no longer ranked on a single spectrum, and it
becomes easier, if not inevitable, to experience the different principles as discontinuities and inconsistencies.
If we had three people voting on what to do in the event of an
attack and they weighted the two underlying principles differently,
they might rank the options in any possible order. One might prefer
Retreat, followed by remaining to Suffer Injury, followed by killing
the attacker in Self-Defense. Another might insist on Self-Defense
(weighting the rights principle heavily), followed by Retreat and, only last, to Suffer Injury. And a third might pacifically favor the Suffer
Injury option (perhaps Retreat wounds pride or rewards the attacker), followed by Self-Defense, and then Retreat. We might think of
law as the outcome of a vote, and we can see that there will be no
stable result here. There is a case to be made for Retreat over Injury
(preferred by two voters), and then one for Injury over Self-Defense,
but finally one for Self-Defense over Retreat. Such a cycle is perverse in the sense that if Texas is bigger than Oklahoma, and Oklahoma bigger than Delaware, we would find it odd for Delaware to be
bigger than Texas. To be sure, the law of self-defense is not exactly a
vote among competing principles; choosing among the options is not
the same as deciding the flavor of ice cream that three people ought
to purchase and enjoy for dessert. In such settings there is only one
principle at stake, satisfying the group's preference for a tasty dessert; this will involve ascertaining each individual's preferences and
then aggregating preferences across the group. The presence of multiple options and multiple voters famously sets the stage for inconsistency or other oddities.'
5
I assume familiarity with the basic Voting Paradox, attributed to Condorcet, and even
with Arrow's famous theorem, but here is a quick refresher course. Imagine three voters, or
groups of voters: X, Y, and Z. X likes Chocolate, Vanilla, and Strawberry ice cream in that order. Y's ordering is Vanilla, Strawberry, and then Chocolate. Z's is Strawberry, Chocolate, and,
lastly, Vanilla. The group can buy one quart of ice cream to share, and prepares to vote. A
simple majority prefers Chocolate over Vanilla, and Vanilla defeats Strawberry by a similar,
but different, 2-1 majority. And yet if we allow a vote on Chocolate versus Strawberry, we find
an intransitivity, for Strawberry wins, with Y and Z preferring that result. Nor will there be
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The ingenuity of this book is in its showing that multiple principles are like multiple voters. Unlike ice-cream lovers,
principles never change their preferences, but ... each principle
[has] its way depending on which of the options under consideration are in fact available. And this is exactly what the law does:
the law follows the principle of no disproportionate punishment
when all three possible options-retreating, allowing oneself to
be injured, killing one's attackers-are available, and it follows
the rights principle when only two of them-allowing oneself to
be injured or killing one's attacker-are available. Once again,
that entails a violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives: how two things are ranked-namely the option to allow
oneself to be injured and the option of killing one's attackernow necessarily depends on the presence or absence of a third
"irrelevant" alternative, namely the option of retreat. This then
produces a loophole in homicide law: the opportunity to "con-

trive" a defense by removing the retreat option (pp 111-12).

stability, or consistency, if the voting is strategic, with each voter planning ahead so as not to
suffer its last choice, or looking to form coalitions. The outcome will depend on the procedure
used for voting. Kenneth Arrow famously showed that no decision-making method can be
guaranteed to satisfy a set of reasonable-looking assumptions: (1) Transitivity (that is, the condition just shown to be violated); (2) Unconstrained Range (if the group chooses between two
flavors and no further options are allowed, there will be a majority vote and no intransitivity,
or "cycling"); (3) Nondictatorship (the group can avoid intransitivity by decreeing that A gets
her way, or that A wins in the event of cycling, but this delegation is ruled out, we might say, as
too undemocratic); (4) Unanimity (if all voters agree that chocolate is the best, then chocolate
ought to be purchased, so this rules out a constitutional rule in favor of chocolate as a means of
solving the intransitivity problem); (5) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (if a voter prefers chocolate over vanilla, and strawberry is then introduced as an option, the voter might
switch to strawberry, of course, but ought not to suddenly prefer vanilla over chocolate). For a
fuller discussion, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 59-60 (Wiley
1951); Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J Polit Econ 328,
328, 330, 334-42 (1950).
A large fraction of Katz's book can be understood as linking public choice theory (or Arrow's Theorem in particular) with law, or "perverse" law, by putting pressure on the fifth assumption-as critics of public choice have done with different aims. See, for example, Gerry
Mackie, Democracy Defended 131-42 (Cambridge 2003) (arguing that Arrow's independence
of irrelevant alternatives condition may be rationally violated in individual preferences or voting dynamics). Thus, the "right" to kill in self-defense disappears, or is demoted in ranking,
when the option to retreat is introduced. With respect to many issues, it is likely the case that
there are relevant, though not patently relevant, alternatives that can be introduced in order to
unsettle previous votes or legal rules. Once we see that legal decisions often involve many
principles or rights-or are "multicriterial," as Katz calls them-the link between public choice
and legal decisions becomes apparent (pp 111-12). But I doubt this would be apparent to many
readers before reading Katz's book. In any event, its cleverness and insights are in the details
and the examples.
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Students of public choice are amused when this assumption
about the independence of irrelevant alternatives is first described,
for it seems absurd suddenly to switch one's relative ranking of vanilla and chocolate after the option of strawberry is introduced. In the
contrived killing case, the dependence on a seemingly irrelevant alternative (the fall and rise in ranking of the right to Self-Defense
when the Retreat option is introduced or removed) materializes because of the multicriterial character of the decision making Once we
see this, we also see that it is impossible to eliminate loopholes. The
key here is not to object to the claim that Retreat is a relevant alternative (because Katz could have introduced other options) but to see
that when we rank three or more alternatives in a way that tries to
accommodate two or more principles, we can get just such a contradiction, or loophole.
Katz offers many examples and certainly enough to convince a
skeptical-but-dogged reader that the backbone of public choice is
embedded within many legal perversities. As is often true with legal
puzzles, there are distracting elements of each example, but Katz
parries these, and he finds a nice balance between arguing details
and pressing ahead with his overarching point.
Loopholes form just one category of perversity that Katz links
to Arrow's insight about aggregation.7 Consider the book's favorite
paradox. A and C arrive at a hospital following an automobile accident. A is at risk of losing both legs, and C a finger. There is one doctor and sufficient time to make just one patient whole. A wants the
doctor to treat C. (Katz is good at the details; A and C are married,
and C is a passionate pianist). Just as the doctor is about to give in
and treat C, unrelated B arrives and requires immediate treatment in
order not to lose one leg. The hypothetical succeeds in revealing the
connection between law or ethics and Condorcet's Voting Paradox,
and then Arrow's Theorem, in its most direct way. We can see why
the doctor first favors A over C, but if A consents and indeed insists
that C be treated, it is as if we have two votes for treating C rather
than A. But then B has a superior claim when compared to C's. And
yet, if the doctor is about to operate on B, A can say, "Fine, operate
on me instead, for I have a claim superior to B's." And then we start
all over again (pp 25-27). One can argue that A's desire, or preference regarding C's passion, is less important than A's (or B's) own
claim, or priority to treatment. But my goal here is not to reargue
6
Katz defines "multicriterial" decision making as the "attempt[] to synthesize a variety
of criteria into a final choice" (p 107-09).
7
See note 5.
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these cases, but rather to communicate the subject of the book. It is
the hidden but frequent connection between legal problems and (collective choice's) aggregation problems.
Katz develops the interesting idea that law's frequent inclination
to categorize rather than to work with continuities serves as a means
of suppressing paradoxes.' Thus, law asks whether there was consent,
not how much consent (pp 166-68). In the emergency medicine example, it intuits that A has a better claim for treatment than does C
or B and asks implicitly whether A can transfer his treatment priority
to C, and not whether A can undertake a partial transfer. It does not
entertain the possibility that A had transferred 0.7 of his right to C
(so that B's one leg defeats the remaining 0.3 of A's claim). One reason, or perhaps the reason, law is so categorical, or "either/or" as the
book labels it, is that it cannot help being so; apparent continuities
run up against boundaries (pp 179-81). One is either pregnant or
not, dead or not, and perhaps guilty (or negligent) or not.
Another very different but equally subtle reason for law's categories is that they help suppress paradoxes. Students of public choice
are familiar with this strategy, or reality, of making underlying incoherence invisible. The presence of two dominant political parties
suppresses evidence of voting paradoxes.' We experience this during
presidential election cycles when we notice intransitivity and instability during primary season but then a calm head-to-head choice-with
confusion sown only rarely by third-party candidates-in November.
More generally, voters might prefer candidate X over Y, and Y over
Z, but then Z over X, but this will be hidden from view if elections
pit only one candidate against one other, as occurs when additional
candidates are excluded for failure to garner enough signatures, sufficient votes in an earlier multi-candidate round, or simply the support of a major political party. The same is true for bills voted on in a
legislature; party discipline or severe restrictions on range (public
choice's word for the admissibility of alternatives) can turn a continuum into a limited set of categories.
One might say that we have evolved toward a first-past-the-post
system, and thus a two-party system, because this comfortably suppresses voting paradoxes that would otherwise paralyze us." If this
8 1 confess that Katz does not put it this way and might even disagree with the statement
in the text (p 174).
9 See Saul Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 Va L Rev 971, 980 n 27, 988 (1989).
10 For a discussion of the first-past-the-post voting system, see Kenneth A. Shepsle and
Mark S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics:Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 179 (Norton 1997).
To be sure, multiparty parliamentary systems have other means of hiding instability, but the
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provocative conclusion is found wanting because of the absence of a
causal or evolutionary story, then one might simply say that because
we have two political parties, potential cycling is hidden from view.
Similarly, consider the rule in parliamentary law making it difficult to
reintroduce a defeated motion." If motion E beats D and F beats E,
we do not normally observe whether F loses to D because D is not
easily reconsidered once it loses to E; without evidence of cycling,
the assembly can move forward without risk of paralysis. Sophisticates will understand that the order of voting on the motions D, E,
and F could make all the difference in the world, and some might
prefer a randomizing device in order to eliminate the power of the
agenda setter, but the deeper point is that there is really nothing we
can do to avoid the problem of the absence of a stable, majoritarian
outcome. In many ways Katz is expanding this notion to a yet deeper
one about law. If we look hard enough, we will find multicriterial decision making almost everywhere, and so it is not surprising that law
develops devices to suppress this nearly inevitable incoherence and
instability.
In the case of C's precious finger, I framed the legal and ethical
question in a manner intended to reveal the suggested link between
multicriterial decision making and collective choice. I intimated that
we could count heads and that this might matter to the doctor. In
that example, both A and C preferred for C's finger to take priority
over A's legs, so that the doctor was outvoted. And then, when B
came along, both the doctor and B preferred treating B rather than
C, so that the AC-coalition lost some of its power. It is a tie vote, and
the doctor might well serve as tiebreaker, although the head counting and tie are suggestive rather than literal and dispositive. Many
instances of multicriterial decision making can be seen this way, inasmuch as most of law is explicitly or implicitly about group decision
making, whether in legislatures, on appellate panels, or more subtly,
in the norms humans have developed (pp 6-7). Katz dares us to
think that multiple criteria can, or perhaps will always, put even one
decision maker in a paradoxical, Arrovian bind (pp 125-26). This is
not the place to sort out that claim, but it would seem that a single
voter could assign points or construct a continuum in order to be

impact of a two-party system, where three options are necessary for cycling, presents a ready
example. For a discussion of the stability of systems with proportional representation, see
Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy 106-11 (Oxford 1996).
11 See Levmore, 75 Va L Rev at 980-81 n 28, 985 n 42, 1010 & n 113 (cited in note 9).
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consistent. In contrast, a group cannot avoid inconsistencies or other
perversities by following this strategy."

At some points Katz's ambition seems to be to show the link between legal oddities, including loopholes and either/or categories,
and the Impossibility Theorem, drawn from the core of public choice
theory. On occasion, however, he comes close to saying that all of
law is connected to public choice in this way because everything can
be turned into a multicriterial decision." The more daring version has
a counterpart in public choice itself. There are thoughtful political
scientists who think cycling is rare," and then there are others who
think it only looks rare but is everywhere unless suppressed; 5 if we
are free to introduce alternatives that divide the majority, it would
appear that we can regularly generate cycling." My aim thus far has
been to communicate at least one version of Katz's ambition, and
perhaps the essence of his claim. I turn now to several questions that
are triggered by the asserted link between law and collective choice.
One question is where we do or should deploy markets rather
than law. The book is about law and not markets; if Katz were on a
different law faculty he would not so completely and silently exclude
markets from his thinking. Still, as soon as we think of either/or
choices, loopholes, and not punishing all we condemn (another one
of Katz's perversities),'7 it is tempting to draw a line between legal/political decisions and markets because markets rely on prices,
which decentralize decisions, aggregate as a matter of course rather
than through law or other coercive methods, and make less use of
categories. One possibility is that some of the oddities that mark
12 Katz might mean that the point system or continuum will eventually run into discontinuities, though that is not always the case.
13 For example, Katz notes that "[l]egal doctrines can be thought of as multicriterial decision-making devices. That means they are structurally very similar to the voting rules that form
the subject of the Arrow impossibility theorems" (p 125). He draws the connection between
law and public choice even more explicitly-even syllogistically-later in the book: "As we
well know by now, the insights social choice theory provides about voting ... apply wherever
rankings of any kind are aggregated. In other words, they are really insights about multicriterial decision making. Legal doctrines being instances of multicriterial decision making, [social
choice theories] should be applicable to them" (p 177).
14 See, for example, Mackie, Democracy Defended at 85-92 (cited in note 5).
15 See, for example, Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 Tex L Rev 1541, 1553-62
(1993).
16 See Shepsle and Bonchek, Analyzing Politics at 101-02 (cited in note 10) (conceptualizing Richard McKelvey's idea that in multidimensional settings, there will always be instability).
17 Katz refers to "undercriminalization" as an apparent legal perversity (p 185).
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multicriterial legal decisions are avoided when markets are deployed.
In turn, this might encourage courts and legislatures to leave certain
decisions to the market. Alternatively, perhaps we mysteriously resort to markets-or to law-when the other threatens us with its inconsistencies. This turns out to be a matter requiring more extensive
analysis than is possible in a section of a Review, but I offer some
ideas about this connection in Part II.
A second, equally difficult, question focuses on the shadow rather than the light. Why the Law Is So Perverse is tantalizing in its
argument as to why law exhibits certain oddities, but such theorizing
necessarily stimulates questions about why and when law is not perverse. If the link to collective choice explains so many of law's twists,
and if there is something of an equivalence between Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the quest to resolve conflicting legal claims,
then why is anything in law straightforward?
Focus, for example, on the observation about either/or categories where a continuum would have been possible. Law sometimes
insists on categories with consequences, apparently as a means of
avoiding multicriterial decision-making problems. The choice between the doctrines of contributory and comparative negligence in
tort law offers a striking example. Contributory negligence is either/or in exactly the way Katz means. Where that doctrine governs,
a plaintiff found contributorily negligent has her recovery from a
negligent defendant, or a manufacturer of a defective product, reduced to zero. But law has moved rather dramatically from contributory negligence to comparative negligence, introducing a continuum
where there had been either/or categorization. Denying recovery to
one who had unclean hands is a plausible principle, so here is an example where multiple and potentially conflicting principles eventually and almost universally generate a continuum rather than an either/or legal framework.'
The example is hardly unusual. Had our legal system replaced
comparative negligence with contributory negligence, Katz could say
that law moved to an either/or method of decision making in order
to avoid paradoxes or other oddities. A jury that could entertain
more options, or compromises, regarding fault and liability allocation would of course be much more likely to cycle than one that was
18 Of course, the jury (if it is a jury case) deciding on comparative negligence numbers
must overcome its own aggregation problems in order to reach a decision, so there is plenty of
suppression of voting paradoxes there. But there remains the question of why and when law
moves to the ostensible continuity of comparative negligence. Law helps the jury compromise,
we might say, even though compromise is not a solution to Arrow's problem.
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asked only, "Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?" before moving on to the next step-especially where there was some hurdle to
reconsidering once-defeated proposals.'9 But here, as in many other
areas of law, doctrine has moved from either/or to a continuum. This
seems to make Katz's theory a rather extreme kind of just-so explanation. It may be that he has identified an equivalence of sorts, but
unless we have a theory of when law willingly tolerates perversity,
we are left only with an observation and with no prediction or even
explanation. I turn to this question, or serious threat to Katz's theory, in Part III.

II. LAW VERSUS MARKETS
Markets do not solve voting paradoxes. Imagine that multiple
diners, seeking to share a quart of ice cream for dessert, rank the
three flavors available for purchase. If a vote by them would reveal a
paradox, the embedded cycle is not eliminated by imposing a point
system or by resorting to a market mechanism whereby the group
simply decides on the flavor to purchase and serve by letting the
highest bidder prevail. Markets cannot promise to deliver on all of
Arrow's assumptions; various kinds of auctions and other market
mechanisms are all devices that fall within the set shown by Arrow to
be unable to satisfy five primitive assumptions.2" A sophisticated way
to see this is to think of the voters as trying to form coalitions in order to finance the highest bid, so that they have more flexibility than
a group bound by the one-person-one-vote norm. The participants
will find themselves cycling because of what game theorists call an
empty core. Every coalition can be defeated by another coalition unless defections are prohibited or range otherwise restricted."
And what if coalitions are ruled out or barred by a first-round
vote or other decision? It is still easy to see that markets cannot
guarantee that which we seek. Even if all participants start out with
equal resources and we hold auctions, a participant is at a loss to
know when to bid high and when there will be little competition so
that one ought to bid little. Every experienced consumer knows that
19 See Shepsle and Bonchek, Analyzing Politics at 53-55 (cited in note 10).
20 See Arrow, 58 J Polit Econ at 339-42 (cited in note 5) (explaining the five assumptions
undergirding the Impossibility Theorem and concluding "the market mechanism does not create a rational social choice").
21 Returning to an earlier example, if X likes Chocolate, Vanilla, and Strawberry in that
C-V-S order, and Y's ordering is V-S-C, and Z's ordering is S-C-V, then perhaps X would pay
$10 to get C, and X suggests that Z join him by paying in $5 in order to be sure of Z's second
choice. But Y wants to avoid getting his third choice and so he might pay to encourage Z to
join him in gaining Z's first choice. X might respond by lowering the price to Z, and so forth.
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one can end up with an outcome that would never have been agreed
to in advance. The fact that prices are dependent on what others
have bid sets the stage for perversities. We might say that markets
usually violate Arrow's assumptions because irrelevant alternatives
(in terms of preferences) lose their independence through price and
income effects. Matters are even worse when we allow for different
endowments.
And yet, markets can play an important role because, among
other things, they decentralize decisions. As soon as we allow something to be decided politically, there is the possibility of coercion, often embedded in a decision about taking advantage of economies of
scale. Imagine that a group is deciding whether to build a one-lane
bridge at point X on a river, as opposed to more expensive two-lane
or three-lane structures.

Voter A
Voter B
Voter C

First Choice

Second Choice

Third Choice

3 Lanes
1 Lane
2 Lanes

1 Lane
2 Lanes
3 Lanes

2 Lanes
3 Lanes
1 Lane

We have a familiar cycle because a majority prefers the two-lane
bridge over the more expensive three-lane version (Voters B and C
rank 2 ahead of 3, reading from left to right); a majority (A and B)
prefers 1 over 2; but a majority (A and C) prefers 3 over 1! We know
that such intransitivities, or other violations of Arrow's criteria, are
impossible to avoid, and no nondictatorial decision-making
scheme-not a majority vote and not a market-will solve this problem. 22 Imagine now that the two-lane option is approved, perhaps because the smallest bridge project was voted on first and, after it lost,
the two-lane version sailed through. Voters A and B might or might
not realize that they ought to be dissatisfied because their majority
coalition in favor of a single lane would have defeated the two-lane
version in head-to-head competition."
But why is the group voting on a bridge in the first place? Why
did the report on the voters' preferences exclude the possibility of
zero lanes, or at least none financed by the government? Perhaps
bridges should be left to private markets. There is a transaction cost
Arrow, 58 J Polit Econ at 342 (cited in note 5).
For a discussion of the role of dissatisfaction, see Levmore, 75 Va L Rev at 993-96
(cited in note 9) (suggesting that common legislative mechanisms were developed against the
backdrop of an intuitive understanding of voting paradoxes and under pressure from majority
coalitions that could perceive losses).
22

23
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to charging tolls or other user fees, so perhaps a publicly owned
bridge is "better," at least for some voters, but lost in that statement
is the possibility that a noncoercive decision is possible. Note that the
question of privatizing bridge building might be a separate criterion,
although rational voters might think that some bridges should be
built by the government and some left to the private sector. A majority can also approve the two-lane bridge and then charge tolls below
the average cost of the bridge, so that there is something of a mixed
public and private project. Even our hackneyed ice cream example
might conceal the possibility that the market could provide a greater
mix of smaller containers, so that each participant could simply buy
the flavor she wants. Everyone could have her first choice, and no
one would be coerced at all.
Alternatively, there could be a path-dependent economy of
scale involved. The market or group might really prefer boysenberry
ice cream, but no entrepreneur produces that flavor; it only looks as
if everyone is happy with the flavor or flavors currently sold. Boysenberry might even be a Condorcet winner of sorts, defeating all
other flavors in head-to-head competition, but only if it can be sold
at a price that gives it a large market share, and it will take some
time for an entrepreneur to discover that millions of consumers will
switch to it from vanilla. Moreover, there may be no first-mover advantage in the ice cream market, so that it really does not pay for
anyone to start down the boysenberry path. It is more profitable to
let others experiment and spend the money advertising and testing
the new flavor. This in turn can produce a collective action problem,
so that no one ever introduces the preferred flavor. All these obstacles to perfect markets are meant to remind us that it is no simple
task to decide what we do by voting and what we leave to markets.
Tangentially, when the choice between markets and politics is
framed this way, it is hard to understand contemporary hostility to
mandates, including a health care mandate. When the majority
builds a bridge, the minority's bridge buying has been mandated. If
there is a constitutional problem with forcing individuals into health
care plans, a determined government could provide the health care
free of charge, or at an irresistibly low price, and finance most of the
plan out of other taxes. With health care, as with bridges and ice
cream, the important decision is whether to bring the good, entirely
or partially, into the public sector.
Returning to legal perversities, the larger point is that markets
often decentralize decisions, for they remove the bias in favor of coercive group decision making. At the same time, well-organized
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groups recognize that they have an advantage in the political arena,
as they can externalize costs." They are unlikely to deregulate and
yield much decision making to markets. There is a kind of market
paradox, in which a majority might agree to have a large private sector, but it is difficult to commit to this in advance as most publicprivate decisions are made one industry, or even one item, at a time.
Each subgroup enjoys the public sector for some goods but loses
with respect to most and must compete with wasteful rent seeking
for all. Again, it is not that markets solve Arrow's problem, it is that
markets might reveal that there was no need for a coercive group decision in the first place.
Markets are much less likely than law to be either/or, for they
specialize in continua rather than categories. We now know that
many institutions and legal rules are neatly explained as avoiding cycling (or some other horror)." One such method is to offer but two
choices. To take another of Katz's examples, an abortion is permitted or not, and law decides one way or another (pp 171-74, 226-27
n 7). As always, every category is tested, and there is give and take at
the edges. A group that wanted to ban abortions and lost can begin
to work against government money for hospitals that perform abortions or in favor of an earlier point in gestation after which abortions
remain impermissible. Still, the either/or character of legal regulation
is there, and markets are by their nature less coercive, especially if
wealth differentials can be eliminated." But why is the continuous
nature of most markets found unattractive in law?
Consider two politically incorrect proposals that aim to test the
either/or character of law. In the more market-like of the two, the
proposal is to retain the ban on abortions in the last two months of
pregnancy but to allow private decisions ("choice") before that time,
except that $1,000 (or perhaps some fraction of income) must be

24
See William N. Eskridge Jr, Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 Va L Rev 275, 284-85 (1988).
25 See text accompanying notes 8-16.
26
I am sensitive to the possibility that law is no more categorical than markets. As a matter of theory (or ironically, categorization), markets must also deal with discontinuities, and
law's categories often have an element of continuous pricing, so that the two are not logically
or categorically different. For example, one buys a shirt in units of one, and a small shirt normally sells for the same price as an extra-large one even though they incorporate different
amounts of material and present different inventory challenges. In turn, one is either speeding
or not, but fines depend on speed. A pharmaceutical is either approved or not, but the government might offer fast-track approval and might not enforce some prohibitions against offlabel use. Still, it is plain that when markets use prices they are more continuous than law tends
to be, and it is surely true that law deploys categories more than markets do. I return to this
distinction in the text. See note 34 and accompanying text.
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paid by the abortion seeker to a fund that will be used to help poor
and disabled children. The plan requires this $1,000 for an abortion
that takes place in the first month of pregnancy and then another
$1,000 for each additional month of pregnancy, so that an abortion in
the third month is half the cost of one chosen in the sixth month. I
suspect that the plan will attract no devotees, but the idea is to appeal to pro-choice constituents by expanding the period during which
choice is available, while signaling that the choice is not undertaken
lightly. And the attraction to pro-life voters ought to be the likely
and perhaps dramatic decrease in the number of abortions. Why do
we not see such a proposal, and why is it likely to fail or even offend?
One reading of Katz suggests that the simpler the either/or
choice in law, the fewer balls are in the air, and the less evidence of
cycling there will be (p 174). We avoid a paradox by limiting range,
and the former is somehow worse or more obvious than the latter. A
related possibility is that the proposal links the price with months of
pregnancy, and this implies too strongly that the later the abortion,
the closer it is to taking a life. This is offensive to the pro-choice
mindset, just as the idea that an earlier abortion is better is offensive
to the pro-life perspective and not just because the lower price might
rush the decision to abort. The either/or approach embedded in Roe
v Wade27 and its trimesters does the same,' but perhaps less so because it uses categories rather than a continuum.
Another reaction to this proposal is a bit removed from the present subject. It is simply that the monthly fee commodifies abortion,
or life, in an unacceptable manner. One can imagine the bumper
stickers: "Fetuses are not for sale." This thrusts the either/or nature
of abortion regulation into a discussion of commodification in law
more generally. There are, of course, many subjects where commodification is resisted, including body parts, voting, and citizenship. The
resistance is sometimes greater where prices are unlikely to induce
greater supply, though that is not the case for abortion.
If commodification is the problem, then consider a continuum
strategy that avoids explicit pricing. What if an abortion were provided and legal for every woman who agreed to one month of community service for every month of pregnancy before the requested
abortion? The community service obligation could be fulfilled by a
man, who certified that he had contributed to the unwanted pregnancy. The idea is to show respect for life, decrease the overall number of abortions, staff worthy community services, provide job training
27
28

410 US 113 (1973).
Idat 163.
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to teenagers, and so forth. If such a proposal would easily lead to cycling, then we might understand the meta-rule, or inclination, against
a continuum and in favor of either/or lawmaking.
First Choice

Second Choice

Third Choice

Group A

Anti-Abortion

Group B
Group C

Service Proposal
Choice

Service Proposal
(fewer abortions)
Choice
Anti-Abortion

Choice
Anti-Abortion
Service Proposal

But the cycling, while not impossible, seems far-fetched. It is
hard to imagine pro-life voters preferring complete choice over this
proposal (unless the community service is of a kind designed to provide a service that is even more offensive to pro-life advocates), and
it is difficult to see why pro-choice supporters would prefer a complete ban over this proposal. If Katz is right, it must be because of a
more general claim that in many situations either/or suppresses cycling, even if there is not that danger here. It is also plausible, if not
likely, that this proposal is simply misguided. A large-scale community service program may be unwieldy, too close to the commodification problem, or simply not yet conceived. Alternatively, existing law
may have already divided the erstwhile majority by introducing waiting periods, parental notification requirements, restrictions on federal funding, rights for protestors, and so forth, all of which put a price
on abortions. Note, however, that this would explain the expenditure
and dissipation of political energy but leave abortion regulation
looking much more either/or than structured along a continuum.
The more fundamental and hostile reaction to the proposed continuum with respect to abortion regulation is of a piece with the idea
that the political virtue of integrity requires us to do what we think is
right rather than to accept internal compromises, or "checkerboard"
solutions.29 In some contexts this can be linked to the counterintuitive
notion that errors are minimized through an all-or-nothing rule, as
when a negligent tortfeasor, found just more likely than not to have
caused a plaintiff's loss, is required to pay the entire damage bill.
Similarly, if a majority of the community, or its judges, thinks abortion a matter of choice (or wrong), then it does less injustice by applying the result to all cases rather than to a subset of them in the
spirit of a compromise. This approach to explaining law's either/or
inclination suggests that some serious issues like abortion will be
29

See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 178-90 (Belknap 1986).
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either/or, and then that structure will necessarily create some perversities near the edges. But it does not explain why we must make believe we are sure of a defendant's guilt or innocence, and the nocheckerboard approach is even less helpful with respect to tort law
and many other areas that are sometimes either/or and sometimes
continuous.
In choosing another example where we might be weaned from
either/or, it is useful to be mindful of still other explanations of why
abortion regulation has not turned into a continuum. From a public
choice perspective, a compelling argument is that once something is
in the political domain, it is attractive if it is stable, so that there is
not constant rent seeking and other costly activity as groups try to
change the law. If abortions were on a price or regulatory continuum, the argument goes, then interest groups would constantly be
working to nudge the price higher or lower. The either/or norm
might make the law more stable, perhaps because dissatisfied groups
can see that it will be hopeless to try to move law all the way to the
other extreme. The argument bears some relation to the case for
final-offer arbitration, which is either/or for a different kind of transaction cost reason." In fact, Roe v Wade is often praised for having
introduced stability to an area of law that might have been extremely
volatile." In turn, this argument is related to the conjecture that interest-group activity is more likely where there is unlikely to be a
Condorcet winner, so that the interest group need only influence the
procedure by which things are voted upon. 2 If correct, then the
naive view would be that interest groups work to make law less either/or in order to influence it. But of course the more sophisticated
approach would be to say that law establishes an either/or convention precisely to limit interest-group influence.
The foregoing conjecture about stability suggests an example
drawn from international law. It has been observed that international law and norms now consider borders between countries to be
nearly inviolable. For much of history borders were altered by war,
30 See Elissa M. Meth, Comment, Final Offer Arbitration:A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and InternationalDisputes, 10 Am Rev Intl Arb 383, 388-89 (1999) (arguing
that final-offer arbitration facilitates bargaining by motivating parties to develop and exchange
their most reasonable positions prior to the arbitrator's decision).
31 See, for example, Neal Devins, Book Review, The CountermajoritarianParadox,93
Mich L Rev 1433, 1445, 1449-55 (1995) ("The Court designed Roe v. Wade to put an end to the
abortion dispute. Justice Harry Blackmun put forth a trimester test governing state authority
over the abortion decision both to make clear what the Court intended and to limit future governmental efforts to sidestep the Court's decision.").
32 See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxesand Interest Groups, 28 J Legal Stud 259, 261-75
(1999).
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by purchase, and by agreements among rulers, or even unilateral
maneuvers by monarchs. But the last century, and the post-World
War II treaties, marked a profound shift toward stable boundaries.
No longer do we see many purchases of territories or wars over borders.3 This stabilizing influence, if it is that, is not exactly an example
of evolution toward either/or, but an instance of a move away from a
continuum. Previously fluid boundaries have become fixed.
It would be interesting to see some natural experiments. Imagine that South Korea offered North Korea $1 billion for each ten kilometers their shared border was moved northward. And then what if
Greece's debt burden had been reduced in 2012 by Germany's buying some of Greece's islands? If these transfers destabilized other
borders in the world, then we might have a nice explanation of stability. It comes close to Katz's explanation of law's taste for category
rather than continuum, albeit one we might have discerned without
any understanding of, or connection to, the Impossibility Theorem.
But my sense is that the Korean example would be accepted in the
international community and the German-Greek (hypothetical)
agreement would not. If so, Katz's point is strengthened. In the Korean case there are few "voters" who want the North's claim to be
stable and, in any event, the destabilizing risk of the land sale might
be preferred over the destabilizing influence of famine in North Korea or fighting between the two countries. In the case of Greece,
however, it is easy to see that the introduction of a new option might
lead to cycling and other instabilities. To be sure, the inalienability of
the Greek islands is not necessarily welfare enhancing, for it is possible that debt repayments and forgiveness impose costs on the parties
that exceed those which would accompany border instability. But
Katz's powerful insight makes no claim about efficiency.
One last example is even more conjectural but directs the discussion back in the direction of law versus markets. It begins with the
observation, or concession, that the claim cannot possibly be that law
is entirely either/or and that markets always operate with a continuum, but rather that each is inclined in the stated direction. And of
course sometimes markets have categories because of law (as when
law refuses to title land in the increments parties would like) (pp 2122), though at times markets develop their own categories because of
transaction costs, network externalities, or comparable reasons.
Shirts come in specific sizes through no fault of law, and in any event
a tailor is free to customize and not be bound by the industry's
33 See Mark W. Zacher, The TerritorialIntegrity Norm: InternationalBoundariesand the
Use of Force, 55 Intl Org 215, 221-24 (2001).
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categories.' The example is of an area that has developed a continuum, along the lines of comparative negligence. In criminal law it appears that long ago penalties were more categorical. In ancient times
there was capital punishment or not, exile (excommunication) or not,
and perhaps maiming or not." The development of prisons created
something of a new continuum, and lawyers began to think more often in terms of the proportionality of punishment. But even before
prisons, punishment could have been more continuous. We do not,
for example, see much in the way of debates regarding the length of
a wrongdoer's exile. Additional intermediate punishments might
well have introduced new criteria (if only because there might be independent reasons to favor or disfavor temporary exile) and thus
generated paradoxes and instability.
A conjecture about criminal law is that plea bargaining is a function of the modern continuum and might even have been unknown
in the days of either/or. This conjecture is rooted in Katz's theory,
and then draws on the earlier discussion about where we find law
displacing markets and where we do not. When law is either/or it
might well miss efficient solutions, but the argument is that it promotes a kind of stability and an avoidance of paradoxes and other
apparent horrors. Once law becomes more market-like, as it does
when it deploys prison sentences of varying lengths, we might as well
see market-like behavior, which is to say bargaining and trading of prison time for other goods, even though new criteria threaten instability.
III. WHEN IS LAW NOT PERVERSE?

An anodyne reaction to this question is to criticize Katz for failing to answer it and to declare ourselves ill equipped to make progress on it. Indeed, this is a fair criticism of an otherwise enthralling
book. I have lauded the author for showing us the astonishing connection between collective choice problems and some legal questions, but the theory he offers is neither falsifiable nor, equivalently,

34 I will not dwell on market-based categories, or lumpiness, except to note that they can
be puzzling. Thus, a retailer's return policy is more either/or than seems efficient. "Your money back if the item is returned within seven days; a store credit is available for any return up to
twenty-one days" is unsurprising if not representative. "Perishable and seasonal goods are accepted for return only within three days of purchase" is another sensible either/or marketbased term. But why do we never see "Return for a full credit minus 1 percent for each day
since purchase"? Such a continuum might be slightly more difficult for the consumer to comprehend, but it avoids the friction that either/or terms generate when the customer is just on
the wrong side of the divide, and it surely better tracks staleness and other retailer concerns.
35 See James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal
Law, 76 BU L Rev 29, 40-55 (1996).
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predictive. We discern a remarkable common ground among various
legal phenomena, but there is no claim that we can predict or explain
where these oddities will fail to materialize. And if the claim includes
the audacious idea that law, like other decision making, will always
cycle if we give it unlimited range, then we must be puzzled by the
fact that law is not always either/or. In any event, Katz has not identified any mechanisms that bring other components of the Impossibility Theorem into play when law is continuous and not either/or.
Moreover, there are areas of law that have evolved away from either/or, as we have seen with regard to comparative negligence and
prison sentences, " but not because of any identifiable relaxation of
another of Arrow's conditions. There are surely many areas of law
that are not and have not been either/or in character, and all these
must be puzzling to those who see potential cycling everywhere. The
public choice insight would be more useful if it helped us understand
the continuum-either/or divide that separates tax law, liability rules,
and criminal sentences from safety standards, liquidated damages,
and free speech.
We can make some progress on these questions by reexamining
the relationship between either/or and instability, as well as cycling
in particular. Either/or will sometimes promote stability and reduce
rent seeking not because it prevents cycling but because it weakens
any group's incentive to invest resources in a bid for change. 7 A
criminal defendant either is or is not found insane, a secured party either does or does not gain priority in bankruptcy, and a government
either does or does not build a bridge (partial investments in private
sector bridges are virtually unknown), but there does not seem to be
any cycling problem that is suppressed by these either/or conventions. However, each of these either/or frameworks discourages parties from trying to slide along the scale toward its preferred position.
The bridge builder does not waste resources lobbying for a partial
government investment when it is clear that the legislature will not
decide to construct the bridge in question.
See text accompanying notes 17-19, 34-35.
Abortion provided a weak example. The proposed "tax" on months of pregnancy revealed the either/or character of the debate. Were the tax not something quickly and viscerally
rejected, it could destabilize Roe v Wade, and then pro-life and pro-choice groups would battle
over the size of the tax. In our present either/or world, perhaps pro-life groups do not battle for
a complete ban on abortions, beginning with a reversal of Roe v Wade, because they think it
too unlikely that abortions will be altogether banned. If so, either/or has that feature, noted
earlier, of promoting stability by disallowing incremental changes. I regard this as a weak example because there is plenty of battling over parental notification and federal funding, which
are probably best understood as forming something of a continuum between the two extreme,
either/or positions.
36
37
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Correspondingly, and more importantly, it is not the case that
every continuum promotes instability. Public choice enthusiasts will
recognize "single peaked" preferences in this claim," but I prefer to
say that we must be on the lookout for multicriteria rather than a
continuum. To see this, compare comparative negligence cases with
international boundary disputes. In the case of comparative negligence, it is hard to see why the continuum available to the jury will
promote instability. A juror who thought the defendant entirely to
blame, in terms of fault and causation, will vote against a contributory negligence defense and will prefer a 100 percent allocation of fault
to the defendant. But if the requisite supermajority cannot be found
for that result, it is hard to see why this juror would prefer a
30 percent allocation of liability to the defendant over an 80 percent
allocation. If some jurors prefer greater and greater allocations, and
others prefer less and less liability, and still others prefer, say,
60 percent and then like it less as we move away from that particular
allocation, there will not be cycling. There are, after all, no multicriteria
but just a different assessment along a single spectrum. Cycling requires
some perversity or orthogonal criterion to be introduced."
In contrast, it is easy to imagine cycling, and thus instability,
where an international boundary is concerned. A voter, or a government, might like it less and less as a boundary is moved northward, but then suddenly like it better if the boundary moved another
five kilometers north in order to keep an entire city or ethnic group
together. The integrity of that group is a second criterion."0 It is
therefore interesting, and perhaps even explicable, that law has
moved away from contributory negligence but toward fixed boundaries. Only one of these either/or conventions is easily linked to the
suppression of cycling.
A dedicated positivist would continue the argument with the example of criminal penalties. Death may be either/or, but once prisons became feasible, there was every reason to follow the intuitionand perhaps efficiency argument-for proportionality because the
preferences voters have with respect to sentence length rarely admit
cycling. If I think a defendant deserves thirty years for his crime, it is
See Stearns, ConstitutionalProcess at 71-77 (cited in note 1).
See id (explaining that cycling can arise where voters' preferences are multipeaked
along a single dimension or single peaked along multiple dimensions).
40 Cycling might also come about because of domestic reactions to boundary alteration.
As the boundary moves, there are serious questions about the future of internal populations
affected by the change in sovereignty. There is also the question of who will pay for the boundary change (if it was a sale) and who will pay for the integration of the populations (if that is
attempted). It is quite likely that these matters implicate multiple criteria.
38
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easy to imagine that I might like twenty years a bit less and ten years
even less than that, but very hard to understand why I would then
rank twenty-five years as inferior to ten. The same is not true once
capital punishment is on the table because some people have an independent objection to that penalty. It is therefore noteworthy but
unsurprising that legal systems often eliminate that option. It is also
easier to see why law is often internally either/or; we do not ask juries to combine prison sentences with community service, time on
work details, or even maiming. Preferences regarding the appropriate level of the two currencies, or penalties, will often not be well
correlated, so a combination would introduce multiple criteria and
then instability.
If we return to the question of markets versus politics, or law,
we might now make more headway on the question of when the legal
system displaces markets. We know that law is significantly more either/or than markets, though the latter are not free of either/or conventions (they have their own weak categories, like shirt sizes).4
Moreover, law often responds to pressure regarding its either/or
framework by adding categories and developing something closer to
a continuum. A pharmaceutical is either approved or not, but then
there is pressure to offer fast-track approval. One is either a murderer or not, but law has added various other crimes to the menu and
thus weakened the either/or description. It is tempting to start with
the observation that markets exhibit more continuity, if only because
of prices and entrepreneurs' ability to add categories and thus fill in
the continuum, and then conclude that we find law to be less either/or when the law is doing something market-like. Thus, tort law
tries to get parties to internalize the risks and harms they impose,
and it does this with a liability rule that is very market-like, and indeed perhaps just what the parties would contract for in the absence
of serious transaction costs (and law itself). Fines for polluters offer
another example of market-like law. In contrast, restrictions on lateterm abortions are not market-like at all and, correspondingly, the
law there is more either/or. It is arguable, then, that law is less either/or when it is more like a market.
But this theory about law versus markets is just a bit circular. It
credits the symptom rather than the cause and misses the deeper
connection developed here. When law is market-like, it is deploying
a continuum that does not risk cycling because multiple criteria are
not in play. It is not the continuum that brings on instability but

41

See Part II.

1684

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:1663

rather multiple criteria, or multiple voters and multiple options, that
bring that on and then generate legal perversities.
CONCLUSION

Why the Law Is So Perverse is unusual and attractive because it
connects public choice theory to law from a vantage point that is
deeply within law. It is a difficult vantage point, in that it forces the
reader to struggle with other means of understanding law and its
puzzles, or perversities, before accepting the idea that Arrow's insight about the aggregation of preferences might illuminate a good
deal of law's structure. The effort required of the reader is well rewarded. Professor Katz has made it impossible to think of any legal
loophole, either/or restriction, or constraint on transferability without looking about to see if there are multiple balls in the air, by
which I mean a looming instability of the kind found in voting paradoxes because of multiple options and decision makers-or, more
subtly, conflicting principles.
The book provides a lens but not a set of predictions. I have
tried to work with its powerful insight to sketch the beginning of a
theory that would truly answer the question posed by the volume's
title. If we are to understand why law is sometimes perverse, or even
the subset of circumstances in which it categorizes, and declines to
present a continuum of the kind we normally experience in markets,
then we must understand when it is not so. A quest for such an understanding took us to the important and even larger question of how
and why we allocate decisions between the marketplace and the law.

